This paper critically examines a recently developed proposal for a border control system called iBorderCtrl, designed to detect deception based on facial recognition technology and the measurement of micro-expressions, termed 'biomarkers of deceit'. Funded under the European Commission's Horizon 2020 programme, we situate our analysis in the wider political economy of 'emotional AI' and the history of deception detection technologies. We then move on to interrogate the design of iBorderCtrl using publicly available documents and assess the assumptions and scientific validation underpinning the project design. Finally, drawing on a Bayesian analysis we outline statistical fallacies in the foundational premise of massive screening and argue that it is very unlikely that the model that iBorderCtrl provides for deception detection would work in practice. By interrogating actual systems in this way, we argue that we can begin to question the very premise of the development of data-driven systems, and emotional AI and deception detection in particular, pushing back on the assumption that these systems are fulfilling the tasks they claim to be attending to and instead as what function such projects carry out in the creating of subjects and management of populations. This function is not merely technical but, rather, we argue, distinctly political and forms part of a mode of governance increasingly shaping life opportunities and fundamental rights. 1 http://web.archive.org/web/20190522155917/https://www.tucsonlocalmedia.com/blogs/university_of_arizona/ar ticle_9e21a4c2-7c68-11e3-932c-0019bb2963f4.html and http://btn.frontex.europa.eu/content/frontex-anduniversity-arizona-test-avatar-bucharest 2 http://iborderctrl.eu/ 3 DATAJUSTICE is a 5-year project funded by an ERC Starting Grant (grant no. 759903)
Introduction
As data-centric technologies come to shape more and more of social life, the areas of borders and migration management have become prominent as sites of experimentation and investment. Characterised in part by a post-9/11 securitisation logic, the so-called refugee 'crisis' of 2015 has heightened focus on border politics, not least in Europe where the simultaneous externalisation and internalisation of borders continue to shape the geopolitics of the European project. The European Commission has set aside a proposed €34.9 billion for border control and migration management between 2021 and 2027 (Gallagher and Jona 2019) . The generation and collection of data plays a pertinent role in this context, with vast interoperable databases, digital registration processes, biometric data collection, social media identity verification, and various forms of data-driven risk and vulnerability assessments now a key part of European border regimes (Metcalfe and Dencik 2019) . Information systems such as VIS, SIS, and EURODAC operate to control the border crossing traffic, migration and asylum applications. For instance, EURODAC provides a centralized database of fingerprints to implement regulations for migrants and asylum seekers and categorize people with labels that determine their legal status and condition their rights (Vassilis and Kuster 2012; Ferraris 2017) . Electronic passports, facial recognition technologies and other biometric information make up the advent of so-called 'smart borders' that have become the hallmarks of EUfunded research and development projects in recent years (Cannataci 2016 ).
These 'smart borders' not only serve new forms of identification and categorisation of people on the move. Increasingly, we are also seeing the (re)emergence of recognition technologies used for detecting emotion and deception as part of a growing risk assessment industry organised around a logic of data accumulation. In 2011, the UK Border Agency deployed an operational trial to evaluate stress anxiety and deception at the immigration desk based on a facial and thermal analysis tool developed by researchers at the universities of Aberystwyth and Bradford in conjunction with defence technology company QinetiQ and funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) (Ugail, Yap, and Rajoub 2007, POST 2011) ). AVATAR, another automated lie detector based on eye-tracking, has been tested in the southern US border (F. Nunamaker et al. 2013 ) and a pilot programme using AVATAR was sponsored and coordinated by Frontex in Romania in 2014. 1 In 2012, the same team that commercialized AVATAR, performed field experiments with EU border guards from several countries to test an early version of the lie detector (Elkins, Derrick, and Gariup 2012) .
Whilst little is known about the outcomes of these pilot programmes, investment in border control technologies said to identify deception and risk has continued. Recent attention has particularly focused on the controversial EU Horizon 2020-funded project iBorderCtrl (Intelligent Portable Control System) 2 which describes its aims as deploying 'well established as well as novel technologies together to collect data that will move beyond biometrics and onto biomarkers of deceit' piloted on European borders. Dismissed as 'pseudo-science' (Boffey 2018 ) and subject to considerable counter-research and activism (see for example the initiative iBorderCtrl.no), the iBorderCtrl project is a significant case study for engaging with the politics of data-driven technologies. In particular, it highlights the relevance of a booming industry in 'empathic media ' and 'emotional AI' (McStay 2018) as it becomes intertwined with highly securitised policy agendas pursued in a context of perceived crisis.
In this article, we build on research into deception detection and risk assessments in order to comprehensively illustrate the politics of both design and execution of the iBorderCtrl project. This forms part of a larger project concerned with understanding datafication in relation to social justice 3 that seeks to engage with the design, practices and experiences of data-centric technologies in order to explore their political economy and implications for social and economic rights. We start by situating the iBorderCtrl project in the context of data-driven governance and the growth of recognition technologies in the digital economy, before moving on to outlining the field of deception detection and its current incarnation in an age of machine learning and artificial intelligence. This forms the backdrop to our analysis of the iBorderCtrl project and the technopolitical assumptions that underpins it. We draw on publicly available documentation in order to provide a statistical evaluation of how the method used in the iBorderCtrl project would work in practice. In particular, we outline the central limitation of applying test design based on data points from a control group to the general population. This statistical limitation in massive screenings is a feature (rather than a bug) of the performance of recognition technologies, that has significant implications for the rights of people, especially marginalised groups and vulnerable populations that are often least able to challenge such systems. In arguing this, we make the case for understanding the pursuit of 'smart borders' and the nature of the technologies that make up the current European border regime as distinctly political processes that need to be engaged with as part of a particular mode of governance.
The political economy of iBorderCtrl
The advent of deception technologies has a long history, but has gained prominence in recent years in conjunction with the growth of 'empathic media', particularly in the form of 'emotional AI' that involves, according to McStay (2018) , 'reading words and images, seeing and sensing facial expressions, gaze direction, gestures and voice. It also encompasses machines feeling our heart rate, body temperature, respiration and the electrical properties of our skin, among other bodily behaviours.' It is a way of engaging with emotion as something that can be observed through means of what can be surveyed, measured and remembered, rather than any 'mentalistic' process, in a way that works well with sensing techniques that classify facial and bodily behaviour. In particular, these are datadriven sensing techniques that have gained prominence in a context of datafication (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013) that refers to the trend to put increasing aspects of social phenomena and human behaviour in a quantified format that can be tabulated and analysed. Whilst much of this datafication initially focused on metadata based on communication and online activities, it increasingly extends to sensors and facial recognition software that generates data based on movements, expressions and physiology, significantly blurring the contours of public and private experiences, and amplifying the embodied construction of data subjects.
The use of such technologies is rapidly becoming a feature of commercial services, including digital platforms and Internet of Things, and is a growing part of contemporary forms of management, with emotion detection now featuring in job hiring and work assessment processes (Sánchez-Monedero and Dencik 2019; Sanchez-Monedero, Dencik, and Edwards 2019). States and governments, often in partnership with industry, have propelled the trend further, turning to data-driven recognition and detection technologies to enact governance. In Europe, the deployment of facial recognition technologies by police has sparked significant debate on citizen rights in public spaces, furthered by a growing discourse of 'smart cities' (see for example the Face Off campaign from Big Brother Watch). Education is another area where facial recognition tools are being experimented with, drawing on developments in China where these are used, amongst other things, to assess attention levels amongst school pupils (Connor 2018) . In security, airports have become primary locations for piloting detection tools based on facial micro-expressions, such as determining levels of anxiety (POST 2011 ). Yet it is perhaps no surprise that it is particularly in border-control, and migration management more broadly, where European states have sought to increase investment in technological tools at significant speed.
The socio-technical assemblage that now makes up border regimes, what Pötzsch (2015) aptly refers to as the advent of the 'iBorder' as a way to articulate the dispersal of the border into remote, algorithmic decisions capable of determining risks, serves as an important setting for the development of iBorderCtrl. Proposed by researchers at Manchester Metropolitan University in the UK, the iBorderCtrl project has been supported by a €4.5 million research grant under the Horizon2020 programme at the European Research Council. It continues a long-standing history of EU-funded security technology, not least in the context of border control and migration management, that has gained further prominence with the growing enthusiasm for the potentials of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Significantly, as several researchers have highlighted, there is a lack of transparency surrounding the processes and details of the iBorderCtrl project, including ethics questions and the relationship between the research team and private companies listed as part of the project design (Wilde 2018; Gallagher and Jona 2019) . In this respect, it also consolidates concerns over the limitations of ethics reviews and the role of industry in guiding academic research, both part of a growing debate in the field of machine learning and AI (Williams 2019).
The iBorderCtrl project centers on the ability to perform automatic "deception detection" and "risk assessment" in the border-crossing encounter. The project proposes a two-stage process with a pre-registration step to provide traveller information, and a later border crossing stage that includes biometrics identification and matching, document authenticity analysis, interaction with external legacy and social systems, an Automatic Deception Detection System (ADDS), a Risk Based Assessment Tool (RBAT) and a post hoc analytics tool (iBorderCtrl 2016a). The aim of the project is to speed up border control for third-country nationals crossing land borders of EU Member states by providing a decision support system for border authorities (iBorderCtrl 2016b). The project includes pilot tests in Hungarian, Greek and Latvian land borders.
The features of iBorderCtrl are typical in smart border systems, but the project is novel in its application of the ADDS. In seeking to 'move beyond biometrics and onto biomarkers of deceit.', the project claims to build proxy features that represent, according to the authors, the action of 'deceiving' that forms part of a constructed digital identity and profile that will inform the categorization of persons as 'bona fide' and 'non-bona fide' travellers (iBorderCtrl 2016a). As we will go on to detail further below, in epitomising not only the ideology of 'dataism' (Van Dijck 2014) in its assumptions about the relationship between people and data, but also the theoretical void surrounding affective recognition systems not least with regards to 'deception' detection (Wilde 2018) , iBorderCtrl emerges as a paragon for the politics of data-driven governance. As a way to illustrate this, we start by situating our analysis of iBorderCtrl in a broader discussion of lie detection devices.
Deception detection

Lie detectors
Deception or lie detection devices, mainly represented by the polygraph, have a long controversial history. Generally, proposals on lie detectors assume that, during an interview, deceptive answers will produce physiological responses and that these cues can be properly measured. These measures are assumed to behave differently when a person does not answer the truth (POST 2011). A second important assumption shared by many studies and proposals is that lying is a valid predictor of guilt (Rajoub and Zwiggelaar 2014) .
Whilst the scientific agreement is that the accuracy of the polygraph and other devices is close to chance when rigorous experimental criteria is met (Saxe and Ben-Shakhar 1999) , supporters of the polygraph claim that deceptive answers produce physiological responses that can be detected by monitoring blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and/or skin conductivity. A systematic review from the US National Research Council (NRC) (2003) concluded that the polygraph, even if it worked as the vendors claim, would not be useful to perform screening of populations with low rates of events in the population since it would produce a large number of false positives (we will develop this analysis in the section on performance evaluation). In addition, the study warns that the indicators these tests rely on can be gamed through cognitive or physical means. Nevertheless, the use of lie detectors is relatively widespread in in some sectors in the US such as insurance, although in most parts of the world it is not recognized as a valid test.
Beyond the polygraph, there have been other devices based on Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (Simpson 2008) , eye-tracking (F. Nunamaker et al. 2013) , electroencephalography (EEG) (Heussen, Binkofski, and Jolij 2010) , voice analysis 4 or thermal facial analysis (Rajoub and Zwiggelaar 2014; Moliné et al. 2018) among others. Other proposals have relied on text analysis in very specific contexts such as robbery reports rather than physiological responses (Quijano-Sánchez et al. 2018 ). Many of these methods have been scrutinized by third parties that in general disagree with the reported accuracy for the devices and conclude that the experimental validations were generally weak. Often the number of participants for testing the tool is far too low to make any robust claims about its accuracy, as in the case of EEG with 15 participants (Heussen, Binkofski, and Jolij 2010) . With regards to voice analysis, the National Research Council in the US concluded that the studies validating voice stress analysis (VSA) as a means of lie detection 'offer little or no scientific basis for the use of the computer voice stress analyser or similar voice measurement instruments' (National Research Council 2003) . Later work by linguistic academics Eriksson and Lacerda (2008) studied the feasibility of computer-based VSA and concluded that there was no scientific evidence to support the manufacturers' claims and rigorous experimental studies found that the detection accuracy was close to chance level. The product analysed by Eriksson and Lacerda (2008) was tested in the UK Department for Work and Pensions over three years and in 2011 the department concluded the detector was not useful after spending £2.4 million (Lomas 2010). The system tested in UK immigration desks in 2011 (POST 2011) was based on a standard video camera and a high-resolution thermal camera to extract 46 features called Facial Action Units to identify deception (Ugail, Yap, and Rajoub 2007) . As far as we know, there are not any public results of this pilot.
Data-driven deception detection
Deception detection started a new era with the popularization of machine learning. Rather than performing an analysis of signals of the polygraph by trained experts, systems in this vein tend to rely on different types of data to fit statistical models to perform the classification task. The variety of systems typically extract features from raw data, such as video or other types of sensors, that represents a time window of the moment a person answers a question, and then label these vectors of features as deceptive or truthful. ML methods fit a model to the training dataset to map the multidimensional feature space to the output label space (deception or no-deception labels). The features can be engineered based on previous research, e.g. a feature that measures blinking of each eye, or they can be learned by the model as part of the overall fitting process, as deep learning and autoencoders do.
Machine learning is the ideal tool to create such mappings since many models such as artificial neural networks are universal approximators, meaning they that can learn/build/fit any function to relate the input space with the label space provided the model is complex enough (Cybenko 1989) . Recent work has demonstrated that (deep) neural networks are also able to learn random labelling of data by memorizing the whole training set (C. Zhang et al. 2016) . As we will elaborate on in our analysis of iBorderCtrl, since ML can build models that correlate anyinput to any-output, data science practitioners have to be particularly careful to avoid issues such as overfitting, the representativeness of the sample, the reductionism of the optimization process or the misalignment of the ML optimization task with the domain optimization task (Lipton 2016) . Universal approximators are successful in creating models for complex knowledge domains such as climate dynamics or specific biomedicine tasks, but also for domains with vague/weak definitions and noisy labelling where humans would find it difficult to create such mapping rules. The case of deception detection has many of these attributes of a weak-defined task: humans cannot universally define neither the input nor the labels in terms of data, the binarization of the problem is a hard reduction from the spectrum of emotions of a person to a binary label (i.e., that lying consists of a set of simulated emotions in a laboratory), and it would be complex to formulate a rule or set of rules to perform the input-output mapping.
Considering the capacity of ML methods to fit models in complex datasets, deception detection heavily relies on the quality of such data sets. The quality of datasets in applied ML refers to how close the test environment is with the deployment scenario, but is also related to rules of robustness in statistical learning such as the number of patterns to comply with the Central Limit Theorem, the number of patterns in relation to the number of features (see the 'curse of dimensionality' discussion below and Altman and Krzywinski (2018)), stratification of the sample, etc.
The ADDS component of iBorderCtrl is based on what the authors refer to as "biomarkers of deceit" (iBorderCtrl 2016a). These are non-verbal facial micro-expressions that, according to the authors, every human produces when lying during an answer. Those signals when combined are therefore said to be able to act as predictors of lying. The biomarkers of deceit are encoded as 38 features, or channels, such as 'left eye blink', 'Increase in face redness' or head movement directions (OrShea et al. 2018) . Each feature is extracted from a video segment of one second in which a person is lying or not when answering a question (although it is not clear from the available documentation how they generate features for the segment). The video is captured at 30 frames per second (fps) with a video resolution of 640x480. Each training pattern of the dataset consists of the vector of 38 features and the label that indicates truth or deception. The gender of the person is also encoded as a feature. To create the dataset, 32 people (actors) were chosen and assigned a role to perform during the interview, in a lab, producing both truthful or deceptive answers. The dataset consisted of 10 classified as having Asian/Arabic ethnic background and 22 as White European background, and 22 classified as male and 10 female. Based on this dataset, an artificial neural network (ANN) is fitted to the training data and the performance is evaluated with patterns of people that were not used to train the model. Each question q is assigned a score that consist of the averaged sum of the prediction of the ANN for each video segment of the question. The model has two parameters to filter segment scores in order to delete unknown facial expressions from calculation of . In the task of detecting a deceptive scenario, the authors reported an accuracy rate of 73.66% when detecting deception and 75.55% when detecting truthfulness.
Generally, datasets for deception detection and micro-expressions detection are built by recording scenes of persons performing a role. However, some projects have sought to create the dataset in a completely different, and more specific, setup. For instance, Pérez-Rosas et al. (2015) used video recordings from trials rather than recording actors. The project segments the video clips of defendants and witnesses and uses the verdict of the trial and the testimonies verified by police to label clips as deceptive or truthful. In this case, a multi-model ML method processed video (non-verbal behaviour including facial expressions but also the movement of hands), audio and text to evaluate clips. The work of Pérez-Rosas et al. (2015) reports a global accuracy of 75.20% as the only available performance metric.
This wider context of deception detection is important for understanding the circumstances out of which a project like iBorderctrl has emerged. It points to a historically flawed area of research, but one that despite errors and lack of evidence has persisted as a technique for assessing people. The desire to find a 'scientific' method to detect lying, and 'emotions' in general (importantly, lying needs to be defined as a set of emotions rather than any other kind of phenomenological category in order to adhere to such desire), is what underpins the flourish of investment in emotion detection, particularly through facial and voice analysis. This desire or political will far outpaces the credibility of the technology. Moreover, as we go on to discuss below, it wilfully ignores the contested assumptions upon which such technology is based.
Assumptions, dataset and experimental validation
In this section, we identify and discuss some of the technopolitical assumptions of the ADDS module of the iBorderCtrl project to critically examine the role of this technology in the context of data-driven governance and border regimes. We base this analysis on a number of academic papers relating to the design of iBorderCtrl (Rothwell et al. 2006; OrShea et al. 2018) as well as public documents available from the iBorderCtrl project website (iBorderCtrl 2016b; 2016a).
The main premise of the ADDS component in the process of screening non-EU travellers is that some of them, for a variety of reasons, can provide fake documents, background stories or data regarding their destination. The project does not specify the intentions of travellers when providing fake information but the example questions are focused on identity confirmation, the content of luggage and information related to other travellers, relatives or friends (see Table 1 ). According to the project's general scheme, a person giving a deceiving response to these questions will be interviewed by a human border guard to perform further investigations. OrShea et al. (2018) .
The goal of the iBorderCtrl smart border is to detect "bona fide" and "non-bona fide" travellers to identify illegal border crossings. The ADDS test will contribute, together with other modules, to the early detection of possible "non-bona fide" travellers by detecting deceptive behaviour. The project includes a 'reward system based on number of successful crossings and trouble-free stay' (iBorderCtrl 2016a; 2016b) to score travellers in the long term and facilitate future crossings. Since the target is to discover illegal activities through lie detection, deception is considered a valid predictor of guilt and risk. The relation between deceptive behaviour and guilt and risk can be found in other pilot programs at borders. The team of Bradford University also used the expression 'lie/guilt detection' in the presentation of their tool (Ugail, Yap, and Rajoub 2007) . AVATAR was tested by assigning 'guilty or innocent condition' to the participants and 'procedures were intended to heighten anxiety and simulate the circumstances surrounding actual criminal conduct.' (Derrick et al. 2010 ). In the context of lie detection, the link between lie and guilt is generally direct, despite identified concerns that such a premise invites a sense of automatic suspicion amongst those subjected to the assessment (POST 2011).
Another base assumption is that there exist non-verbal facial gestures, labelled as 'biomarkers of deceit' by the authors, that are indicators of deception during an interview. This assumption is based on the theories of Paul Ekman that claims that lying is an emotionally demanding task that may leave non-verbal behavioural traces (Ekman and Rosenberg 2005) . The model is also premised on the assumption that facial non-verbal micro-gestures can be measured. Micro-gestures or micro-expressions are extremely quick facial expressions that last between 1/25s and 1/5s and have been said to be used as proxy features to recognise emotions (M. Zhang et al. 2014) . Micro-expressions are encoded into numeral features, for instance, by an algorithm that extracts a feature to measure eye blinking by tracking the eyes during a video segment. To capture such fast events, typically 200fps (frames per second) cameras are used (Yan et al. 2014; Davison et al. 2018) . However, in a previous project by the authors, Silent Talker, 15 fps cameras were used to capture micro-gestures (Rothwell et al. 2006) whereas the ADDS uses 30fps cameras (OrShea et al. 2018 ). It is not clear from available documentation what the limitations of using such low fps cameras are for capturing micro-expressions. Moreover, systematic meta-analysis reviews reported that the accuracy deception detection based on non-verbal behavioural observation is close to chance (Bond and DePaulo 2006; Vrij and Granhag 2012) . Among several reasons, one simple explanation is that both people lying or telling the truth would do similar emotional work to seem honest when confronting an interview with consequences (DePaulo et al. 2003 ).
The term "biomarker" or "biological marker" is typically used in medicine to refer to 'a broad subcategory of medical signs -that is, objective indications of medical state observed from outside the patient -which can be measured accurately and reproducibly' (Strimbu and Tavel 2010) . The authors of the ADDS state that biomarkers of deceit are non-verbal signals that alone cannot reveal deceptive behaviour but together can be used by an ML method to detect lying. This means that according to this model, deceptive and non-deceptive behaviours are two non-overlapping categories that represent a set of emotional states. The use of a binary deception detection model therefore reduces the emotional states of a person into two categories 5 : deceptive and truthful. When assigning a label to the video segment(s) related to an answer, the ADDS only considers that the emotional states of a person can be grouped as deceptive or truthful and no additional possibilities are allowed. However, the model has two parameters to filter un-meaningful segments when there is not a clear category for them. This is a different approach than the one found in other works dealing with emotion labelling (but not in the context of deception detection) where systems might relax this reduction by adopting a multilabel scheme by which several emotions can be detected simultaneously, including a category for neutral emotions (Barrett et al. 2019) .
In general, the common basis of lie detectors is that there are universal and involuntary physiological responses that a person produces as a result of lying. In the case of the ADDS, it assumes that across persons, ethnicity, gender, age, functional diversity, neurodiversity, etc., there is a universal way of expressing deception through non-verbal expressions. According to the authors, provided with a large and diverse enough training dataset, the tool might be able to detect deception amongst heterogeneous travellers (OrShea et al. 2018 ). This assumption is partially shared with methods for emotion detection, which assume that all persons feel and express emotions in the same way. What is more, the ADDS is premised on the assumption that the scenarios used for data collection and method validation are representative enough for real environment conditions. Data was gathered from participants that performed roles for truthful and deceptive scenarios, such as including a 'simulated drug package (soap powder in clear packet)' in the traveller case (OrShea et al. 2018) . Generating a suitable dataset is a common problem for data-driven deception detectors. The team of AVATAR motivated the deceptive behaviour 'by offering substantial monetary bonuses to participants that were judged as credible, and by having the "crime" committed re-alistically.' (Derrick et al. 2010) . Other teams told participants to interpret roles to convince an examiner that they were honest (Rajoub and Zwiggelaar 2014) . As an exception, Pérez-Rosas et al. (2015) used real situations instead of actors by gathering data from real trial recordings. Yet, apart from problems with representativeness stemming from the creation of situations of 'real' deception, the problems with relying on particular forms of behaviour as indicative of lying as well as the assumed universality of modes of deception cues across different demographics and populations remain significant fallacies in the training and validation scenarios.
Moreover, critical questions arise in relation to the way the ADDS has been validated before conducting the pilot programs. The experimental setup in (OrShea et al. 2018) consisted of a sample of 32 participants. The authors claim that this sample size is similar to other studies by citing their previous work in 2006 (Rothwell et al. 2006) . The sample consisted of 17 deceptive and 15 truthful participants with diverse profiles of gender and ethnicity. For each person, 38-dimensional vectors were generated for each question so that the training set consists of 86,586 training patterns. The generalization performance was tested with a leave-one-out (LOO) experimental design that was repeated 9 times to test the performance of the classifier in detecting deception in two unseen persons (one deceptive and one truthful participant). The detection rate for these 9 pair of persons was, in average, 75.56% and 73,67% for deception and truthful participants. This small sample size has some problems beyond the obvious lack of representation noted above, particularly in light of the nature of populations crossing European borders. From a statistical and ML point of view, the data sample needs to grow in relation to the number of input features (38), the number of classes (2) and the number of parameters in the model (unknown in this case). As a rule of thumb, several tools (such as scikit-learn) recommend having at least 50 data samples to fit a model 6 . It might be said that the number of data samples in the case of iBorderCtrl is 86,586, however, since these points are obtained from 30 participants (two are used for testing), it is unclear whether the points extracted from each person can be rich enough to represent the population in the 38-dimensional feature space. We can hypothesise that, for each participant, the generated patterns can be very close in the feature space and at the same time they can be very distant to the vectors generated for other people. That is, the data in the feature space is very sparse, which can produce several problems. In statistics, this is known as the 'curse of dimensionality' (COD) (Altman and Krzywinski 2018) and it is especially relevant when the sample size is smaller than the number of dimensions of the data (30<38 under our hypothesis). The COD is well known to cause problems such as overfitting and unstable model predictions. Even without public information to fully check our hypothesis, we can see some hints to support it if we observe the high variability in the classification performance of the experiments with unseen persons that got 24,37% of standard error for deceptive participants and 34,29% for truthful participants (see Table  2 ). To further support our hypothesis, we can observe the performance of the ADDS for persons whose vectors are both in the training and test sets. In this case, the mean performance is near 95% for both types of participants and the standard deviation is significantly reduced to 1% and 0.86%. As a consequence, we can conclude that it is very likely that the ML model overfits in relation to the data points. 7 These assumptions point to the contested scientific premises upon which iBorderCtrl has been able to position its model as a solution to a constructed problem of deception detection as a significant function of border control. These do not address the wider questions of the premises of optimisation in terms of risk estimation and speed of border crossings that are key features of the iBorderCtrl project (although not all detailed in the available publications); nor do they address the fundamental questions of the purpose of borders, the right to lie, or the tendency towards discrimination and punishment against the most marginalised and vulnerable populations likely to experience the violence of borders (for a discussion of these issues, we refer to the resources published on www.iborderctrl.no). Discussions on assumptions outlined above need to be considered in the context of these broader questions, but here we want to focus on some of the technical fallacies as a way to illustrate the politics of selling innovation in the context of a perceived security crisis and the false construction of binary trade-offs. 7 In general, to alleviate the problem of dimensionality the sample set should provide at least 10 ; that is, 10 data points per the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension. For a simple linear model, = + 1, that in our case would be 39, means the smallest acceptable number of patterns would be 390. Note this number is just a reference since there are no details of the architecture and type of neural units used that can help to estimate the actual VC dimension of the model (Bartlett et al. 2019 ).
Statistical limits of massive screening
In order to further elaborate on the limitations of the design of iBorderCtrl, we now turn our attention to assessing how the model presented in documentation would actually 'work' in practice. Whilst our focus is specifically on the method for deception detection outlined in the iBorderCtrl project, we see our analysis as being relevant for models intended for massive screening more generally.
Massive screening of travellers and migrants can be seen as a form of mining massive data sets with a pre-trained model that evaluates the whole population of persons represented by data points. Within this setup, cautious preliminary analysis and performance evaluation must be done, especially when looking for rare events, such as looking for liars between hundreds of million border crossings. First, even in random sets of data there are many chances of having events of interest with are not meaningful, false positives, that can overlap with meaningful events depending on how narrowly defined the events of interest are (Leskovec, Rajaraman, and Ullman 2014) . This would apply for instance for the risk estimation module of iBorderCtrl. Second, when performing a test to search for rare events, such as a deception detection classifier, in whole statistical populations, rather than directly considering the test outcome, i.e the conditional probability of having a liar given the data, that probability needs to be corrected within a Bayesian framework to move from conditional to posterior probability. That is, to calculate the probability a person is an actual liar given the test output and the frequency of the event in the population (National Research Council 2003; Fenton and Neil 2010) .
Bayesian statistics provide a principled method to incorporate prior beliefs about an event to evaluate the relationship between the observed data (test) and that belief. Another point of view is to separate the properties of a test or classifier from the characteristics of the statistical population. In this section, we will use the Bayes rule to interrogate the behaviour of the ADDS.
A test can produce four outcomes, in our case:
• True positive: the test detected deception and the person lied.
• False positive: the test detected deception and actually the person did not lie.
• True negative: the test does not detect deception and the person said the truth.
• False negative: the test does not detect deception and the person lied.
The performance of the test can be represented in the confusion matrix. Table 3 is built with the information provided in (OrShea et al. 2018) . The test output produces conditional probabilities given the observed data (biomarkers of deception). For the above table, we interpret that if a person lies there are 73.66% of chances of having a positive test (true positive) and 26.34% of having a negative test (false negative). If the person tells the truth, there is a 24.45% of chance the test will be positive (false positive) and 75.55% the test will be negative (true negative).
However, the above data refers to the behaviour of deception detection, not the actual probability of each type of outcome in a real context. The framework of Bayesian statistics allows to correct the test performance with information about the application context in the form of prior probability, meaning the frequency or prevalence of the event of interest. We can formulate a different hypothesis of the prior P(Lie), for instance, 5% of liars, and observe how each type of result of the test varies. For the case of 5% of liars, the corrected probabilities of each test outcome are shown in Table 4 . The corrected performance is interpreted in the following way. For example, if we have 1,000 people being interviewed with 50 liars and 950 non-liars, ~38 out of 50 liars will be detected at the cost of wrongly labelling ~232 innocent people as liars. Approximately, 13 liars would not be detected by the test and ~717 people would be correctly classified as not deceptive.
Finally, to evaluate the expected behaviour of the deception test, Bayesian statistics help to answer the question 'provided we have a positive test, what is the probability the person is lying?', that formally corresponds to the posterior probability, also known as positive predictive value (PPV). We can calculate the posterior by using the Bayes Theorem:
where:
• ( Lie | + ) is the probability of having a liar (Lie) given a positive test (+), this is the posterior probability.
• P( + | Lie ) is the chance of having a positive test (+) when the person is lying (Lie). This is the chance of true positive (73.66%). • P(Lie) is the chance of having a person that would lie in the interview, formally prior probability but often referred to as frequency or prevalence. It is a characteristic of the population, not of the deception test. • P(Non − lie) is the chance of having a person that is telling the truth (P(Non-lie)=1-P(Lie)).
• P( + | Non-lie ) is the chance of having a positive test (+) when the person is not lying (Non − lie). This is a false positive (24.45%).
Therefore, we can calculate the posterior with the hypothesis of 5% of liars in the population that will be screened:
( Liar | + ) = 0.7366 × 0.05 0.7366 × 0.05 + 0.2445 × 0.95 ≈ 13.69%
This means that, in a scenario of 5% of liars, 13.69% of positive tests will correspond to actual liars crossing the borders and 86.31% will correspond to false positives, meaning only 1 positive in 8 persons labelled as a liar would correspond to an actual liar. Regarding false discoveries, the negative predictive value (NPV) or posterior of negative tests, ( Non-lie | -), gives the probability of having actual truth-tellers when the deception test is negative. In the same scenario, the NPV is 98.20%, so most of the interviews with negative results correspond to people that did not lie. Figure 1 shows a graphic example of the decision tree of events relating the corrected outcomes of the test and the posterior probabilities. To highlight how the deception detection test would behave with different ratios of liars (prior probability), Figure  2 shows how the PPV and NPV vary under different hypotheses. It is pertinent to note that predictive values, or posterior probabilities, represent how much we ought to believe in the outcome of the deception test for an individual under different reasonable choices of priors (Hellman 2019). Although it is not clear in the public documentation about iBorderCtrl how frequent it is believed that deception is during border-crossings, from Figure 2 , we can know that if there is one liar or criminal in 10,000 people, the PPV would be 0.03%, if there is one in 1,000 the PPV would be 0.3% and 13.69% for the case of 5 in 100 people. It is straightforward to check that the smallest prior that produces a posterior of 50% would be the case of 1 criminal in every 4 persons. In other words, when the ADDS labels a person a liar, is extremely unlikely that this person lied during the interview unless we have a scenario in which we consider deception to happen very frequently. 8 We might note that all our statistical analysis relies on the case that all the assumptions we identified for the ADDS in the previous section hold, and that hypothetical criminals would not adopt any counter measure to game the system. Therefore, even in the most favourable case for iBorderCtrl it is very unlikely that the tool can work in practice.
Conclusion
The turn to data-driven systems has taken hold of large swathes of state activity, often advanced by its own inherent logic of data accumulation as a recourse to better and more efficient forms of governance. Funding agendas and resource allocation is mimicking this logic, advancing projects that have sought to capitalise on the political economy of digital infrastructures and the increased securitisation of policy. The iBorderCtrl project epitomises the current moment of data politics in terms of its constitution, design and execution. Initiated in 2016 under the European Commission's Horizon 2020 programme, the project exemplifies the race to AI, the growing industry around emotion detection, and the (re)integration of psychometrics into population management, underpinned by a perceived political crisis that has strengthened the rhetoric of border regimes. By interrogating the actual mechanisms by which the iBorderCtrl project is said to function, we therefore want to draw attention to the wider politics of the development and deployment of such technologies. This is particularly pertinent as the 'super-charged bureaucracy' (McQuillan 2019) advanced by AI is part of (re)shaping the conditions of social, economic, and political injustice that are overwhelmingly burdened by the already marginalised. As Mcquillan puts it, the inherent right to move and live is not a right if the person has to win it by confronting AI.
We have shown this by outlining the techno-politics of the iBorderCtrl project and the extension of inherent fallacies of deception detection. Moreover, we have shown the foundational premise of massive screening to lack statistical soundness that undermines any workings of the iBorderCtrl design in practice. The high-level technopolitical task of detecting irregular border crossings is at best a weak surrogate of the actual machine learning task, that, even in the case of supporting the chain of assumptions in the design, is to reduce a set of facial expressions to a label of deceptive of truthful behaviour when answering a question. This becomes only more startling when we begin to consider the level of complexity of the situations and backgrounds of populations at border-crossings.
By interrogating actual systems in this way, we can begin to question the very premise of their development, moving away from the notion that these systems are fulfilling the tasks they claim to be attending to, and instead ask what function such projects carry out in the creation of subjects and management of populations. This function is not merely technical, but rather, as we have argued, distinctly political, and forms part of a mode of governance increasingly shaping life opportunities and fundamental rights.
